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The comment published by Ruth Allen on pretrial publicity began as an advanced legal research paper under 
my supervision. This is a particularly timely piece in light of the 0.1. Simpson murder trial, which may provide 
the single best forum ever for examining the issues presented by this comment. Ms. Allen begins her examination 
of the topic by taking her reader back to Sheppardv. Maxwell, the "0.1. Simpson case" of its day, and the first 
opportunity for the Supreme Court to thoroughly address the constitutional implications of pretrial publicity. Ms. 
Allen carefully analyzes the overlapping and frequently conflicting constitutional and policy considerations among 
the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, particularly 
as the later relates to the presumption of innocence, when weighed against the First Amendment rights ofthe press 
and the public. She does a superb job of reflecting the balance among these rights and examining the methods 
available to insure that the First Amendment rights can be honored, while in no way detracting from the defendant's 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The remedies Ms. Allen discusses in her commentary are restraining 
orders and disciplinary rules. She shows her reader how to apply her analysis to any current" crime ofthe century." 
Professor Byron L. Warnken 
Pre-Trial Publicity: Can There Be A Fair Trial When 
The Press And The Prosecutor Join Hands? 
Ruth G. Allen 
"Murder and mystery , society, sex and suspense 
were combined in such a manner as to intrigue and 
captivate the public fancy to a degree perhaps 
unparalleled in recent annals. Throughout the 
preindictment investigation, the subsequent legal 
skirmishes and the nine week trial, circulation con-
scious editors catered to the insatiable interest of the 
American public in the bizarre. .. In this atmo-
sphere of a 'Roman Holiday' for the news media, 
Sam Sheppard stood trial for his life."! 
Sam Sheppard was convicted in 1954 for the blud-
geoning death of his wife. During the entire pre-trial 
period, "virulent and incriminating publicity about 
Sheppard and the murder made the case notorious."2 
Before the jury began deliberations they were 
not sequestered and had access to all news media 
though the court made "suggestions" and "re-
quests" that the jurors not expose themselves to 
comment about the case ••• Pervasive publicity was 
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given to the case throughout the trial, much of it 
involving incriminating matter not introduced at 
trial .•. At least some ofthe publicity deluge reached 
the jurors.3 
Sheppard's conviction was upheld on appeal, and 
the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.4 He 
filed a writ of habeas corpus and ultimately, the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari and held that Sheppard 
did not receive a fair trial consistent with the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
court's decision was based on the trial judge's failure to 
fulfill his duty to protect Sheppard from the inherently 
prejudicial publicity, which satu-
rated the community, and his 
prosecutors or defenders, who use the press to obtain 
as partial a jury as possible, courts should respond. 8 
Few courts, however, are willing to challenge the 
protection of the First Amendment and restrain trial 
participants as a remedy to minimize the effects of 
prejudicial pre-trial publicity. Consequently, they focus 
on reducing the prejudicial effect by relying on lesser 
measures to protect the rights of an accused to a fair and 
impartial trial. 
Voir dire is a remedy frequently used by the courts 
even when the case has been saturated with pre-trial 
publicity.9 InMu 'Min v. Virginia, \0 the Supreme Court 
held that the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury 
and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment right to due process 
failure to control the disruptive 
influences in the courtroom. 5 The 
Court remanded the case to the 
district court with instructions to 
issue the writ and release 
Sheppard from custody.6 
Inside the courtroom, 
there are procedural 
safeguards to restrict the 
prosecutor and protect 
the accused Outside 
do not require that prospec-
tive jurors be questioned 
regarding the specific na-
ture of the pre-trial public-
ity surrounding the case for 
which they are being se-
lected. The fair trial right is 
not implicated merely be-
cause jurors have been ex-
posed to publicity; rather, 
the standard is whether "the 
It can be argued that Sam 
Sheppard would have been con-
victed in spite of the deluge of 
sensational news reporting be-
fore his indictment and during 
his trial. However, the fair trial 
the courtroom, however, 
a lawyer's comments 
may be protected by the 
First Amendment 
right is violated when potential 
jurors are allowed open access 
to inflammatory information 
about the accused, when the media reports incriminat-
ing allegations not entered into evidence, and when the 
press disrupts a trial in progress to the extent that the 
defense is irreparably damaged. 7 While this setting may 
appear extreme, it is arguable that such sensationalism 
could exist today in a court oflaw. 
One need only reflect upon the extensive pre-trial 
publicity surrounding the O.J. Simpson case to confirm 
that such media events occur forty years after Sheppard 
v. Maxwell. Today, the media impact is more pervasive 
and more likely to reach and influence an overwhelming 
number of potential jurors. As a result, the court is faced 
with a delicate but highly important balancing act 
between the fair trial rights of the accused and the 
public's right to be informed of what transpires inside 
the courtroom. The Supreme Court has cautioned that 
this sort of delicate balancing should be undertaken 
reluctantly; but when provoked by attorneys, whether 
jurors had such fixed opin-
ions that they could not 
judge impartially the guilt 
or innocence of the defen-
dant."11 The existence of bias is irrelevant, as long as 
the jurors' opinions are not so fixed that they cannot put 
bias aside and judge the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant impartially.12 
Today, communities are often inundated with sen-
sational news reporting. Often, prosecutors zealously 
pursue high profile suspects with an eye toward public-
ity. In fact, it might prove impossible to bring certain 
cases to trial without some imposition on the fair trial 
rights of the accused. Consequently, restraint of the 
trial participants may arguably be the only effective 
measure in preventing prejudice to the criminal defen-
dant. 
The Sixth Amendment ensures a criminal defendant 
the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury 
of the state and district where the crime was commit-
ted. 13 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires an impartial judge. 14 Along with 
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the rights of the accused is the public's right to be 
informed of what transpires in the court system in order 
to judge whether the system of criminal justice is fair and 
right. 15 The judiciary has the responsibility of protect-
ing the due process rights of the accused while main-
taining the interests of society. 16 Yet in recent years, it 
has become increasingly evident that the due process 
rights of the accused have been seriously threatened by 
dramatic and prejudicial publicity.17 
In a highly publicized trial, saturation ofthe commu-
nity with news about the case can be a factor in 
determining whether the publicity might prevent a fair 
trial. 18 Excessive publicity may interfere with the due 
process requirement that the burden of proof with 
respect to each element of the crime, must be borne by 
the prosecution.19 When pre-trial publicity shifts the 
burden to the defendant by reducing the possibility of 
obtaining an untainted jury and requiring him to over-
come the effects of prejudicial and sometimes errone-
ous publicity, the community is denied its opportunity 
to participate in the judicial process, and the accused is 
denied his right to a fair trial. 
In many cases, the prosecutor is the best source of 
extrajudicial statements.20 He is viewed as the most 
informed party to the case, and he interacts with law 
enforcement personnel, judges, court employees, de-
fense counsel, and interested citizens. 21 More impor-
tantly, he has access to the government's evidence. 
Inside the courtroom, there are procedural safeguards 
to restrict the prosecutor and protect the accused.22 
Outside the courtroom, however, a lawyer's comments 
may be protected by the First Amendment. 
Usually, the prosecutor's primary purpose for 
making a statement to the press about a pending indict-
ment or an ongoing trial in a criminal action is to inform 
the public. Too frequently, however, this is not the only 
reason for releasing information to the press. The 
prosecutor's objective may be an attempt to enhance his 
public image or status in the community with an eye 
toward employment in the private sector or future 
political considerations.23 More likely, the purpose for 
releasing incriminating statements to the press is to 
increase the probability of indictment or conviction of 
the accused at trial by influencing future grand jurors 
and trial jurors.24 
Similarly, there is an incentive for the prosecutor to 
gain an advantage over the defendant in any plea 
bargaining negotiations. A prosecutor has more lever-
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age during plea negotiations if the defendant fears that 
he will be unable to obtain an impartial jury as a result 
of pre-trial publicity. To have the prosecutor feed the 
press evidence in anticipation of a trial is to make the 
state itself, through the prosecutor, a conscious partic-
ipant in trial by newspaper.25 
The prosecutor represents a sovereignty whose 
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its 
obligation to govern at all, and whose interest in a 
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but 
that justice shall be done.26 The prosecutor as a 
representative for the state has a duty to protect the 
interest of both the accused and the state. The twofold 
aim of which is that guilt shall not escape nor innocence 
suffer. 27 
Protecting the integrity of the adversarial criminal 
litigation process from external influences is a state 
concern parallel to, but independent of, the interest in 
protecting the individual rights of the accused.28 While 
statements from both prosecutor and defense counsel 
can affect this interest,29 the prevailing view is that the 
statements ofthe prosecutor are more likely to influence 
jurors,30 and that prosecutors may more readily violate 
the "no comment" rules.31 
Pre-trial publicity may be challenged as interfering 
with the presumption of innocence that characterizes 
the criminal justice system. The theory of the criminal 
justice system is that the decisions to be reached are to 
be adduced only by evidence and argument in open 
court, and not by external influences, whether private 
talk or public print. 32 The primary characteristic of the 
system is the constitutional requirement that the pros-
ecution establish the defendant's guilt by proofbeyond 
a reasonable doubt. 33 
The presumption of innocence thus refers to a 
burden of proof, and not a determination by the justice 
system that the accused is either guilty or innocent. It 
has been defined as "that bedrock 'axiomatic and 
elementary' principle whose enforcement lies at the 
foundation of the administration of our criminallaw;"34 
a basic component of a fair trial under our criminal 
justice system;35 an assumption that in the absence of 
facts to the contrary, assumes that a person's conduct 
was lawful. 36 
Both the presumption of innocence instruction and 
the beyond a reasonable doubt instruction must be given 
to the jury. 37 In Taylorv. Kentucky,38 the Supreme Court 
raised the presumption of innocence jury instruction to 
a constitutional dimension when it held that a criminal 
defendant's right to a fair trial was violated under the 
due process guarantee offundamental fairness whenev-
er the trial judge failed to give a requested presumption 
of innocence jury instruction.39 
The majority opinion in Tay/or asserted in dicta that 
the primary function of the presumption of innocence 
concept is to serve as a warning to lay jurors. While the 
legal scholar may understand that the presumption of 
innocence and the prosecutor's burden of proof are 
logically similar, the ordinary citizen may well draw 
significant additional guidance from the presumption of 
innocence instruction. 4O The 
speech is to shield the factfinder from influences other 
than evidence and argument presented in the court-
room.44 Lawyers cannot communicate with jurors 
outside the courtroom either before or during trial; they 
should not be able to champion their case publicly 
through extrajudicial comments which might influence 
prospective jurors either directly or through the result-
ing public opinion. 45 
The counter argument to restricting an attorney's 
speech is that the prosecutor does not lose his right of 
free speech when he becomes an attorney. Those who 
espouse this view rely on the fact that the prosecutor is 
publicly accountable,46 and 
Court emphasized that this in-
struction serves a "special pur-
pose" beyond that covered by a 
reasonable doubt instruction, "in 
that it cautions the jury to con-
sciously eliminate from their 
minds all the suspicion that aris-
es from the arrest, indictment, 
and the arraignment, and to reach 
their conclusions solely from the 
legal evidence introduced at tri-
al."41 Standing alone, the pre-
sumption of innocence instruc-
Tile Model Rules and tile the public has a First Amendment right to judi-
cial proceedings.47 Conse-
quently, the same standard 
that applies to both press 
and public should apply to 
the prosecutor. 
Disciplinary Rules are in 
place because tile legal 
community saw a need to 
police itself. As a result, 
restrictions which do not 
The Supreme Court has 
held that a state must find a 
clear and present danger of 
actual prejUdice or immi-
nent threat before it may 
apply to either the public or 
tile press are enforceable 
against officers of the court 
tion is an inadequate safeguard against exposure to 
extensive pre-trial publicity. The "special purpose" 
would be served by this instruction only in an ideal 
world with ideal jurors. The burden placed on the juror 
with this instruction is evident. Jurors are asked to 
consider only evidence and argument introduced in the 
courtroom and to disregard what they have seen, heard, 
or read outside the courtroom. After repeated expo-
sure, it is doubtful whether jurors can limit the 
decisionmaking process solely to evidence presented at 
trial. Even with a presumption of innocence jury 
instruction, biases may be taken into the jury room and 
resurface during deliberations. 
The Supreme Court has referred to an accused's 
right to a fair trial as the most fundamental of all 
freedoms.42 It is this fundamental right that led the 
Court to suggest that a state can restrict an attorney's 
speech due to his unique role in the judicial process, 
even when the same restrictions would violate First 
Amendment rights ifimposed upon the press or individ-
uals.43 
The central purpose of restricting an attorney's 
limit the press's right to 
publish reports about pending judicial proceedings.48 
However, in Gentile v. State Bar a/Nevada, 49 the Court 
held that a state can regulate attorney speech under a 
lesser standard of review than that reserved to the press 
and individuals, advocating a "substantial likelihood" 
standard to protect a state's legitimate interest in guard-
ing the integrity and fairness of the judiciary. 50 Addi-
tionally, this standard closely corresponds with the 
ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. 
ABA Model Rule3.6(a) prohibits an attorney from 
making any "extrajudicial statement ... that will have 
a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an 
adjudicative proceeding. "51 This provision is broadly 
interpreted to include statements relating to "the char-
acter, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a 
party, suspect ... or witness, the expected testimony of 
a party or witness," ... the "possibility of a plea of 
guilty, ... the performance orresults of any examination 
or test, and . . . any opinion as to . . . guilt or 
innocence. "52 The rules specifically permit an attorney 
to furnish only a description of the charges and defenses, 
the schedule of proceedings, and the identity of the 
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defendant and the victim. 53 Additionally, Model Rule 
3.8 requires prosecutors to exercise reasonable care to 
ensure that law enforcement personnel do not make the 
type of extrajudicial comments which they are prohib-
ited from making under Model Rule 3.6. 
The primary concern of Disciplinary Rule 7-107, 
commonly referred to as the "no comment" rule, is to 
curb an attorney's improper comments and not to 
safeguard his free speech rights. 54 The Supreme Court 
has endorsed the "substantial likelihood" standard and 
the right to restrict an attorney's speech. 55 A violation 
of the no comment rule could subject a lawyer to 
disciplinary action, which can result in sanctions rang-
ing from private reprimand to disbarment. A responsi-
ble attorney must recognize that extrajudicial state-
ments can cause harm not only to the defendant, but also 
to the attorney and the judicial process. 
The disciplinary rules, standing alone, would serve 
to protect fair trial rights from the prejudicial effect of 
extrajudicial statements if lawyers exercised self-re-
straint or if the rules were strictly enforced. Complica-
tions would still exist, however, between the attorney's 
constitutional right to speak outside the courtroom and 
the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. 
At best, restricting attorney speech under the rules 
is problematic. The no comment rule and the Model 
Rule on pre-trial publicity can be construed as prior 
restraints on the speech of attorneys because they enjoin 
the lawyer's right to speak freely. The no comment rule 
is content-based and ordinarily violative of the First 
Amendment. Additionally, it has been argued that both 
rules are either vague or overbroad and therefore 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment. A rule 
that a lawyer shall not comment on a pending case when 
that comment threatens to prejudice a trial or the fair 
administration of justice is vague because it does not 
provide notice about what mayor may not be said. 56 
Arguably, a rule that lawyers may not comment about 
the character of a witness is overbroad because it 
includes speech that often does not threaten the fairness 
ofa trial.57 
The Model Rules and the Disciplinary Rules are in 
place because the legal community saw a need to police 
itself As a result, restrictions which do not apply to 
either the public or the press are enforceable against 
officers of the court. Both prosecutors and defense 
attorneys have a duty to protect the interests of the 
accused and the rights of the public. To engage in 
conduct to the contrary is a violation of an ethical duty 
and subject to sanctions. It is unethical for an officer of 
the court to release inflammatory and prejudicial state-
ments with the potential to violate the fair trial rights of 
the defendant and seek refuge behind the First Amend-
ment. Courts must prevent such incriminating state-
ments before they are communicated. 
Ethical restrictions are not the only means of regu-
lating an attorney's public statements. Trial judges have 
the power to inhibit or prevent media reporting and 
access to the criminal process when they believe that 
unrestricted public statements might prevent a fair trial. 
The restraining order is a form of regulation that enjoins 
both the lawyer and the press from commenting publicly 
on a pending case. Even if a fair trial can ultimately be 
ensured through voir dire, disciplinary rules, or some 
other device, there are serious costs to the judiciary 
system. 58 The state has a substantial interest in prevent-
ing officers ofthe court from imposing such costs on the 
judicial system and on the litigants. 59 
The restraint of an attorney's speech, under the 
Model Rules and Gentile, is narrowly tailored to achieve 
these governmental objectives. The regulation of speech 
is limited as it applies only to that speech that is 
substantially likely to have a prejudicial effect; it is 
neutral as to points of view, applying equally to all 
attorneys participating in a pending case, and it merely 
postpones the attorneys' comments until after the tri-
al.60 
The First Amendment does not immunize trial 
counsel from discipline for public statements which 
might affect the fairness of a pending case.61 When the 
prosecutor speaks publicly about a pending criminal 
case, he does so with a due process limitation that does 
not constrain the press orthe public;62 he may not violate 
the due process rights of the accused.63 If the rights of 
the accused are violated by the effects of the prosecu-
tor's public comments about the case, the standard of 
review is whether there is a substantial likelihood that 
the statements will prejudice the adjudicative process.64 
At its best, the press has traditionally been regarded 
as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, 
especially in the criminal law field.65 Its function is 
documented by an impressive record of service over 
several centuries.66 The press does not simply publish 
information about trials, but guards against the miscar-
riage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, 
and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and 
criticism.67 At its worst, a sensationalistic media can 
substantially prejudice the fair trial rights of the defen-
dant. 
United States v. Simon,68 fully acknowledged that 
the public has a First Amendment right of access to 
judicial proceedings, while criticizing the press for 
failing its duty to act responsibly when exercising this 
right. The court in United States v. Abrahams69 did not 
question the First Amendment rights of the press, even 
though the exercise of free speech from the media made 
it impossible for the defendant to receive a fair trial 
anywhere in Massachusetts, the rest ofN ew England, or 
the Northeastern section of the United States, including 
New York, New Jersey or Pennsylvania.70 Habitually, 
the Supreme Court has been unwilling to place any 
direct limitations on the freedom traditionally exercised 
by the news media for "[ w ]hat transpires in the court 
room is public property."71 
It has long been recognized that there is a profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on 
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open.72 On the other hand, Justice Black argued 
forcefully in the dissenting opinion in Cox v. Louisiana73 
that "[f]reedom of discussion should be given the 
widest range compatible with the essential requirement 
of the fair and orderly administration of justice, but it 
must not be allowed to divert the trial from the very 
purpose of a court system ... to adjudicate controver-
sies in the calmness and solemnity of the courtroom 
according to legal procedures."74 
The Sheppard v. Maxwell Court emphasized that 
the trial court "should have made some effort to control 
the release ofleads, information, and gossip to the press 
... and recommended the gagging of trial participants 
where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial 
news ... will prevent a fair trial." The Supreme Court 
has stressed that the cure lies in those remedial measures 
that will prevent the prejudice at its inception75 and 
emphasized the trial judge's "major responsibility for 
acting to mitigate the effects of pre-trial publicity. "76 
Courts upholding prior restraints have used the reason-
able likelihood standard to evaluate whether the activity 
restrained might result in an unfair trial. 77 Case law 
suggests that judges take seriously the responsibility of 
restraining trial participant's extrajudicial comments.78 
State appellate courts have encouraged trial courts to 
use the publicity precautions set forth in Sheppard to 
prevent the effects of intensive pre-trial publicity.79 
Unfortunately, some courts still consider this remedy 
extreme. 
In Journal Newspapers Inc. v. State,80 the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland vacated orders having the effect 
ofenjoining certain classes of individuals from making 
public comments about various aspects of the prosecu-
tion and restricting public access to certain documents 
that were to become part of the proceedings. 81 The trial 
judge recognized the competing interests and attempt-
ed to strike a fair balance, however, the appellate court 
emphasized that the balance should have been struck 
closer to the First Amendment than to the Sixth Amend-
ment. 82 
This ruling conformed to the 1976 Supreme Court 
decision in Nebraska Press Assoc. v. Stuart,83 wherein 
the Court held that "prior restraints on speech and 
publication are the most serious and the least tolerable 
infringement on First Amendment rights."84 The test 
laid out in Nebraska Press requires that before placing 
a prior restraint on publications, a trial court must 
examine "(a) the nature and extent of pre-trial news 
publicity; (b) whether other measures would be likely to 
mitigate the effects of unrestrained pre-trial publicity; 
and ( c) how effectively a restraining order would oper-
ate to prevent the threatened danger. "85 
Nebraska Press involved the constitutionality of a 
gag order issued by the trial judge as the result of 
widespread publicity. While the trial judge could 
reasonably have assumed that the publicity reached 
potential jurors, the Supreme Court found that he could 
only speculate as to whether the jurors had a fixed 
opinion making it impossible for them to decide the guilt 
or innocence of the accused impartially.86 The restrain-
ing order, therefore, was defective because the state 
court had failed to determine if other measures would 
have mitigated the effects of the publicity. 
While the Sheppard v. Maxwell Court focused on a 
remedy that would prevent the prejudice at its inception 
and endorsed the gag order for trial participants, Ne-
braska Press established that a prior restraint should be 
the last remedy considered and not the first. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts must take such steps as are necessary by rule 
and regulation that will protect the accused and the 
judicial process from prejudicial outside interferences. 
These same protective measures, however, may collide 
with other constitutional rights of the accused and the 
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speaker. Premature disclosure and weighing of the 
evidence in the news media can seriously jeopardize a 
defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury, and neither 
the press nor the public has a right to be contempora-
neously informed by the police, prosecuting attorney, 
or informed police sources of the details ofthe evidence 
being accumulated against the defendant. Trial courts 
should take strong measures to ensure that the balance 
is never weighed against the accused. While there is 
nothing that proscribes the press from reporting events 
that transpire in the courtroom, where there is a 
reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial 
will prevent a fair trial, a trial judge should employ any 
effective remedy to minimize the prejudicial effect. 
Trial by newspaper is unfortunate, but it is a reality. 
Unless the courts accept the responsibility of restrain-
ing trial participants -- the most effective remedy to 
curtail the effects of extrajudicial statements -- the right 
to a fair trial in the criminal justice system may well 
prove impossible to protect. Inflammatory and preju-
dicial statements can and do influence the conduct and 
behavior of the public and the trial participants. 
All parties to the judicial process have a duty to 
protect the constitutional rights of the accused and the 
rights ofthe community. The press must recognize its 
duty to act responsibly. Attorneys must recognize that 
obedience to ethical rules may require abstention from 
what, in other circumstances, might be constitutionally 
protected speech. Finally, courts should sequester 
juries and restrain trial participants when necessary to 
prevent pre-trial publicity from prejudicing the fair trial 
rights of the accused. 
When the constitutional rights of two competing 
interests collide, the court is faced with a difficult 
decision in protecting one and abridging the other. 
Both require protection because we all lose when the 
constitutional rights of anyone individual are violated. 
But most important are the fair trial rights of the 
individual faced with the loss of life or liberty. When 
life, liberty, reputation, and privacy are at stake, the 
public's right to know should become secondary and 
postponed, without challenge, until the completion of 
the trial. 
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